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which the natural sciences demand, while casting off the pious brand, is not a forlorn hope.

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DISCUSSION

THE AFFILIATIONS OF PRAGMATISM

IT is not possible ever to read anything from the pen of Professor Lovejoy without being impressed both by that pleasantness and clearness in statement and that scholarly vision of historical continuity in philosophy which are his notable characteristics. The latter quality, especially, appeals to me, the more so as it is rare in these days of grubby detail in historical research and turgid "independence" in spontaneous insight. Contemporary controversy needs a little to be enlightened by a vision of the past, and a little to be sobered by a realization of the intimate nearness of intellectual movements apparently long since lapsed. It is, accordingly, a genuine service that Professor Lovejoy renders both to pragmatism and to realism in his suggestive treatment[1] of Professor Montague's investigation into their compatibility. It is, however, a service which has the defects of its virtues, inasmuch as history proceeds by mutations as well as by continuous alterations, and it is always easy, with our retrospective conceptualizing, to confuse the one with the other. What we already possess is so convenient and satisfactory a mould for the new material, so warm and intimate a light to see the strange thing by, that the temptation to envisage the fresh fact in the old concept is invincibly powerful, and not infrequently the ancient glamour serves rather to befog than illumine the novel discovery. Or it suffuses the latter only in part, perhaps its least significant part, leading one to think that what is so suffused is all that is. To be without the sanity of historical vision is certainly bad, but to allow its perspective to distort the new and unstoried object is worse. I can not help feeling that some such distortion is present in Professor Lovejoy's so lucid and interesting orientation of pragmatism and realism.

The pragmatic movement, Professor Lovejoy thinks, is a compound product—the union essentially of "instrumentalism" and "nominalism"—nominalism most of all. Pragmatism contains "the typically nominalistic motive—the simplifying, clarifying, *denkökonomische* motive; the typical nominalistic method—the definition of universals as collective names for particular items in experience;

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[1] This JOURNAL, Vol. VI., pp. 575–580.

the typical nominalistic result—the rejection as negligible, if not demonstrably unreal, of all entities incapable of being brought within the compass of concrete experience.'' And this ''nominalistic empiricism in epistemology has always made for idealism in metaphysics,'' inasmuch as idealism is ''primarily an application of the law of parsimony to ontology.'' That pragmatism, therefore, ''should incline to realism is surprising, . . . that it should imply realism indicates a paradox. . . .'' The epistemological essence of the compound of nominalism and instrumentalism is the repudiation, Professor Lovejoy further holds, of the ''correspondence'' theory of truth and the substitution of ''inter-temporal for trans-subjective reference, in its interpretation of the criteria alike of 'serviceableness' and of 'objective validity.' '' But such ''serviceableness'' is ''idealistic in its logical tendency'' or leads to a *''tertium quid* distinct from dualistic realism of the ordinary sort.'' Inasmuch as the latter realism is Professor Montague's, and is ''fully committed to the copy or duplication theory of knowledge,'' realism is *not,* in Professor Lovejoy's opinion, compatible with pragmatism.

It is not my purpose to take issue with this one opinion. The ambiguities and confusion of this orientation seem to me of such nature that it is rather my aim to present a substitute and somewhat opposed description of the general relationships of pragmatism, realism, and idealism. Idealism, like pragmatism and Christianity, is also capable of manipulation and uneven emphasis; so is realism. And it is, therefore, a pity that Professor Lovejoy did not further detail his notion of the idealistic implications of pragmatism. It is more a pity that he could not see his way to discussing, in connection with ''nominalism,'' the ''relational theory of consciousness,'' for if the former enters pragmatism at all, it enters, apparently, by that theory, yet seems in the light of that theory to be quite a different thing from medieval nominalism, or even nineteenth-century or Machian nominalism; and these two also contain significant differences which Professor Lovejoy has failed to note. It is to be hoped that we shall hear from Professor Lovejoy on both these matters. In the meantime, failing more elaborate treatment, I shall try to show (1) that the ''nominalism'' in pragmatism is different from historic nominalism; (2) that it commits pragmatism not to idealism but to realism; (3) that it is not incompatible with *epistemological* dualism.

1. The similarity of a nominalistic, idealistic, and pragmatic motive does not require much discussion. Tom Smith and a crow may both want to cross a river as quickly and as easily as possible; and Smith may swim across and the crow fly across without thereby either in process or intent implying or depending on each other.

Parsimony in intent can not be denied even crude dualism of the spirit-matter kind. And it is always to be remembered that the *facts* our "isms" deal with are approximately the same, and that the "isms" differ and supersede each other as realism, idealism, and pragmatism, *qua* methodological approaches to the control of them. They are additional in the world of facts—new ones, used to manage the older ones.

A more difficult point is the determination of the relations between pragmatism and historical nominalism. They turn, as Professor Lovejoy points out, upon the characterization of the universal. To the pure nominalist the universal seems, indeed, a "collective name" for particular items in experience. For pragmatism, however, just because pragmatism is "instrumentalistic" as well as "nominalistic" the universal has to be considerably more than such a mere *flatus vocis.* The "concept" *man,* to serve teleologically as Professor James shows it to be the function of universals to serve, must be just that identical and identifiable configuration of elements *discoverable in each man,* and serving as a standard of identification for all. In fact, the pragmatic doctrine of the universal may be construed as akin to medieval conceptualism. What is individual and particular is a complexity and thickening of the universal and general. The latter may be found anywhere, alone, or in groups, as the case may be, and is itself simple or complex. *Man,* for example, is a complex universal, and correspondingly *less* universal than *red,* or *point,* which are simples. Combine *man* with other "universals," such as *place, time, gravity, mass,* etc., and you get *a man:* the more the universals, the greater the particularity. If it be objected that *man* occurs in various places at the same time, I must reply that so does everything else. The problem offered by this repetition of identicals seems to me as false as the problem of the "ultimate" nature of being. The barren datum given us to start with is what it is and behaves as it behaves. The spontaneous fecundity of any element the mind once encounters—*man,* or *red, e. g.,* which causes it to reduplicate itself with infinite variety, is as common and familiar a fact as any known to philosophy or to daily life. That each instance of *red* should be the *same red* is not more inexplicable, nor more intelligible, than that red should be at all. It is the *red* that makes its sameness, not the moments of it. Now for pragmatism, it must be obvious to any one who has studied the pragmatic theory of knowledge on its merits, *red* can not be a "collective name" for particular *reds.* That a thing shall be *as it is known,* requires just this loyalty of a thing to itself, this "will-to-be" (if I may speak mythologically) of the knowable which makes us call it universal. Of course, there would be no "problem" and the world would be infinitely easier to live in if there were only one of each kind of entity, *red, man, circle, centaur,* etc.; but nature seems to abhor uniqueness even more than the traditional vacuum and takes only an inebriate's interest in her favorite offspring, mankind. Pragmatically, it is enough that any one thing given in experience seems recoverable and identifiable over and over again. So identified and recovered, it is called "universal"; enumerated, it is called "particular"; but it is not a "collective name": it is just what it appears to be whenever, wherever, and however it appears. This being the case, no entity whatever is rejected in and for itself; no entity is found "unreal"—only *more* or *less* negligible, according to the different situations in which it occurs. And certainly nothing whatever is regarded "incapable of being brought within the confines of concrete experience." The latter phrase, indeed, seems to me of doubtful consistency, inasmuch as the very fact that an entity is known well enough to be given a positive epithet, would seem to bring it to that extent directly within the confines of experience, and, therefore, of "concrete experience," if by experience is meant the experience of any intelligible mind whatsoever. In "Does Consciousness Exist?" "A World of Pure Experience," and other similar papers, Professor James has, I should think, made this point sufficiently clear. I take it, indeed, to be the foremost presupposition of the "relational theory" of consciousness. And it *de facto* rules out historical nominalism. In truth, it cuts under the whole nominalistic-realistic controversy, by substituting for dualisms of substance and status, the pluralism of function, of the world of radical empiricism.

2. In such a world, is realism ruled out? On the contrary, that pragmatism implies ontological realism has seemed to me so clear as to render Professor Lovejoy's assertion that it implies idealism as much paradox to me as was Professor Montague's contrary one to him. Even if nominalism were really a chief demand in pragmatism, the idealistic implication would still be to seek. Idealism has two phases, historically related, but in no necessary logical dependence on each other. The first phase is epistemological idealism or subjectivism. Its essence is the doctrine that knowing is identical with creating, and that the reality of things is contingent on their being known. The ontological implication of such a theory of knowledge is notoriously a variety of the second phase of idealism—idealism as a doctrine of substance. By this variety the world is defined to be substantially the cognitive act of an absolute knower who as "subject," knows himself as "object," etc. It need only be mentioned how repugnant this sort of idealism is to the spirit of pragmatism—almost the whole pragmatic controversy consists of

refutations of it. There is, however, another form of the idealistic doctrine of substance, not based on the idealistic theory of knowledge, which is not intrinsically repugnant to pragmatism, but neither is it implied thereby. This form is pluralistic panpsychism—an ontological theory often mentioned with sympathy by Professor James. Its essence is the doctrine that the substance of the universe and the substance of our mental states are identical. But what is the substance of our mental states? Pragmatically taken, what is mind-stuff? It is *tree*-stuff, *man*-stuff, *of*-stuff, *but*-stuff, *centaur*-stuff, *God*-stuff, *horse*-stuff, etc. In short, the pragmatic essence of this doctrine is the observation that *tree* is *tree, man, man,* wherever they occur; that studied in *relation* to our bodily responses they are states-of-mind, and studied in *relation* to themselves and each other they are objects in the universal environment, while intrinsically they are—to use Dr. Sheffer's apt term—*neutrals.* Their proper status is not determined by their being known, but by themselves as they assume this or that relation. Such, if I understand it, is the philosophy of pure experience as expounded by Professor James, and if this is not realism, I do not know what is. It is not, indeed, the "traditional realism" which requires an absolutely irresolvable isolation of two opposed substances, but it is realism certainly in so far as it is repugnant to subjectivism or epistemological idealism, *i. e.,* the assertion that *esse* is *percepi.* There is a form of it which may involve, altogether superfluously, as does, I suspect, Professor Strong's mind-stuff philosophy, the complication that the *esse* of *each* thing is *percipere;* but even then, the metaphysical reality and substantial status of each thing is not affected, and the epistemological consequence is not subjectivism, but what Professor Strong has called substitutionalism. A thing the existence of which is identical with its acting cognitively is on a far more significant metaphysical level than a thing the existence of which is the derived function of a cognizing substance. To idealism the latter is all *unreality* and illusion; the former, the *sole* and *unique reality.* Eliminate the uniqueness, *i. e.,* absolutism and subjectivism, and you have a genuine pluralistic panpsychism and *imply genuine epistemological,* if not metaphysical, *realism.* For then the one and only thing a *cognitive act* can know is another *cognitive act,* its metaphysical peer, a reality by definition. Thus the panpsychistic hypothesis that things exist only in so far as they know is in no degree incompatible with realism and does in fact imply it. Certainly *men* exist only in so far as they know, and whether other things do is a matter for empirical verification. But actually, the fact that one kind of being is knowing does not preclude the number of the kind, nor does it imply the unreality or non-being of other kinds, nor does it give them a "subjective" and hence unreal status. That is possible only when cognition and creation are identified.

3. Is pragmatism, by its theory of knowledge, committed to this identification? Or may it admit the kind of realistic dualism which Professor Montague asserts and Professor Lovejoy denies it to imply? What I have already said points, I think, to a negative answer to the first and an affirmative to the last question. The issues raised by Professor Lovejoy will, however, bear further examination. Their considerable plausibility rises, perhaps, from the "psychologism" of our leaders and their use of old terms for new things. It is, however, clear that any student may, as a matter of method, treat any portion of a complex without denying the existence of the rest of it; and if, of any of the elements in the "whole situation" which Dewey treats, James chooses only to deal with the relation of truth to its object, epistemologically, and Schiller the relation of belief to belief, psychologically, they are fully within their rights and in no sense thereby committed to anything outside the scope of their intent. The unfortunate ambiguity of their English is regrettable and one may agree with Professor Lovejoy that our "temporalistic way of thinking has its technical categories still to forge."[2] But because our way of thinking is temporalistic and our terminology not altogether professional, does it follow that we may not be "dualists" in epistemology? Professor James, indeed, asserts his dualism again and again.[3] On the other hand, because an idea is numerically different from its object, need it remain eternally so, and can they never fuse and coalesce, as might two numerically different drops of water, into a richer unit of the same kind? If not, why are not "image" and "object" simultaneously present in consciousness, two in number and status, to be compared or contrasted directly? But the majority of cases of "true knowing" are identically no more than just this "thickening," in time, of our ideas. What, *e. g.*, is the difference between conceptual *red* and actual *red* if not a difference in vividness, intensity, "thickness"—if not, *i. e.*, an additive difference? Do, however, the time-process and "temporal reference" exclude a *contemporaneous object*, external to the "idea" and therefore "trans-subjective," which may be temporally reached? No more than the sign-post excludes the contemporaneity of the thing it signifies. If the situation actually required such exclusion, the whole pragmatic account of meaning would, in some sense, lapse. For the

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[2] Cf. the delightful article, "The Obsolescence of the Eternal," *Philosophical Review*, XVIII., 5, p. 501.

[3] Cf. "The Meaning of Truth," preface, pp. 41 (note), 47–50, 102–119, 215, 236, 291—in fact, it is repeated in almost every essay of the book.

"independence" of what is known from the "conscious experience of the knower" is one of its fundamental postulates. But such independence is understood by pragmatism according to the *requirements of reality,* not of *words.* Therefore, the independent object is independent and trans-subjective in the sense that it is *free to enter or leave* "conscious experience," but not in the completely agnostic and nihilistic sense that a mind may never directly encounter it at all. If Professor Montague means the latter relation to obtain between knowledge and its object, I agree that a pragmatist can never be a realist and should never be so silly as to want to be one. But it did not seem to me that Professor Montague meant that. What he did mean, I prefer, however, to let him say for himself. For pragmatism, the world is real, and *idea* and *object* are not single, but dual, because for pragmatism knowing is *not* creating. A dualistic epistemology can not be denied pragmatism because idea and object obviously *fuse* into one in every case of valid knowing. The two terms which pragmatism uses indicate that pragmatism holds them to be two. But one, *idea,* is an instrument, the other *object,* is the goal or subject of the instrument's function. That they may be and in most cases are partly, or even wholly, identical in quality and diverse in number, that the numerical diversity reduces itself to numerical unity in every case of true knowing, is the central fact which makes possible *representative* knowledge in any sense of that hard-used word. The business of the *idea* is to eliminate itself, bringing you face to face with its object or some one of the object's implications or associates. In that consists its representative power. To say that it never does so and never can, seems to me contrary to fact; to say that because it does so objects must be declared unreal and its functional difference from the object denied, seems worse than oversight of fact; it seems inadvertent perversion of fact for the accommodation of theory.

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PROFESSOR SANTAYANA AND IMMORTALITY

G. LOWES DICKINSON'S question "Is Immortality Desirable?," his own answer, and Professor Santayana's reply in this JOURNAL,[1] give an unusual opportunity for suggesting a point of view which does not seem to have been so far considered. From this standpoint we may gladly accept Professor Santayana's protest against a radically false ideal—fostered, if not created, by current linguistic usage—in the desire for *im*mortality.

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[1] Vol. VI., p. 411.